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Proposed Revision of I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2): A New
Definition for Brother-Sister Controlled Groups
A large corporation can reduce its taxes by dividing into several
smaller corporations, since it thereby divides its income among the
smaller corporations. The total income is thus taxed in lower brackets,
with each small corporation receiving its own set of deductions and
credits. The corporate unit as a whole pays less tax. As long as a single
source controls each of the smaller corporations, the group may con-
tinue to operate as a single entity, even though formally it is made up
of separate corporations.
This misuse of the multiple corporate form distorts the tax struc-
ture envisioned by Congress, under which many credits and deductions
are intended to provide a greater benefit to small corporations in lower
tax brackets. An independent small corporation benefits from only a
single portion of credits and deductions, while a larger business can
take advantage of many portions by adopting the multiple corporate
form. To prevent this distortion of the tax structure, Congress devel-
oped a test characterizing these multiple corporate groups as affiliated
corporations, also called controlled groups. 2 Because the group is con-
trolled as a single entity, it is taxed as a single corporation.
1. See infra note 21 & accompanying text.
The small business tax benefit at issue in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S.
16 (1982), was a surtax exemption. See discussion beginning infra note 32 & accompanying
text. The first $25,000 of corporate earnings was exempt from the federal surtax on corpo-
rate income. At the time of the case, a controlled group was limited to one surtax exemp-
tion. The surtax exemption was replaced in 1978 with a graduated rate structure, and
members of a controlled group, the situation described in the text, must now share a single
rate schedule. I.R.C. § 1561(a) (1982).
The following sections of the Internal Revenue Code also rely on the § 1563 definition
of a controlled group of corporations to ensure that small business tax benefits are not mis-
used by multiple corporate groups: I.R.C. §§ 535(c)(5) (accumulated earnings credit),
804(a)(3) and 809(d)(10) (small business deduction for life insurance companies),
404(a)(1)(C) and 414(b) (ERISA), 125(g)(4) (cafeteria plans), 465(c)(4)-(6) (at risk limita-
tions), 58(b) (minimum tax on preference items), 414(b) and 415(g) (pension, profit-sharing,
and stock bonus plans), 46(0(6) (investment tax credit), 179(d)(6)-(7) (election to expense
depreciable assets), 474(c)(1)(B) (small businesses sharing an inventory pool), 52(a) (new
employee credit), 48(c)(3)(C) (used § 38 property), 44F(f(I), (5) (credit for research), 409A
(l)(4) (credit for employee stock ownership plans), and 50B(g)(1) (work incentive program
credit); see Bonovitz, Brother-Sister Controlled Groups Under Section 1563: The 80 Percent
Ownership Test, 28 TAx LAw. 511, 512 (1975); see also Pearlman, Recasting the Multile
Corporate Group After the Multoile Surtax Exemption Ends, 41 J. TAx'N 194 (1974).
2. A controlled group is a group of corporations controlled from one central source.
See infra notes 13-22 & accompanying text.
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One of the current tests for characterization as a controlled group
is set forth in section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code. It is a purely
mechanical test that distinguishes between two types of controlled
groups: parent-subsidiary groups and brother-sister groups.3 A parent-
subsidiary controlled group exists where a corporation owns eighty per-
cent or more of the voting stock or of the value of all classes of stock of
another corporation.4 A brother-sister controlled group exists where
five or fewer individuals, estates, or trusts own or control at least fifty
percent of each corporation in the group identically, and also own or
control at least eighty percent of each corporation in the group.5 This
Comment examines problems inherent in the test used to determine
control of a brother-sister controlled group.
Interpretation of the eighty percent ownership requirement of the
brother-sister controlled group test has been the subject of extensive
litigation.6 The Treasury regulation adopted contemporaneously with
I.R.C. section 1563 stated only that the test was satisfied if somewhere
in the group of five or fewer shareholders there exists at least eighty
percent ownership or control of each corporation. 7 The Tax Court,
however, found this regulation invalid, holding that each shareholder
must possess an interest in every corporation in the group before any of
that shareholder's stock can be counted in satisfying the eighty percent
test for any one of the corporations.8 In early 1982, the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of this Tax Court interpretation in United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer Co. 9
Although Vogel Fertilizer clarified the interpretation of the current
statute,10 the statute itself does not effectively prevent the abuse of a
multiple corporate structure; it is in some respects underinclusive and
in others overinclusive. Because the eighty percent test is so high, a
group of five or fewer shareholders can control two or more corpora-
tions as an entity for many purposes, but as long as the shareholders
own less than eighty percent of each corporation, none of the corpora-
tions will be included in a controlled group. The gap between the po-
3. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1)-(2) (1982).
4. Id. § 1563(a)(1).
5. Id. § 1563(a)(2). In computing the 50% test, the statute includes the stockholdings
of a shareholder only to the extent that they are identical with respect to each corporation.
For example, if stockholder A owns 20% of corporation X and 35% of corporation Y, he or
she owns only 20% of corporations X and Y identically. This measures the overlap in con-
trol of the two corporations. On the other hand, the statute includes all stockholdings in
computing the 80% test.
6. See infra note 23.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1972).
8. Fairfax Auto Parts v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798 (1976), rev'dper curiam, 548 F.2d
501 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977). See also infra note 20.
9. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
10. See infra notes 41-48 & accompanying text.
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tential for control for many purposes at fifty percent and the guarantee
of control for most purposes at eighty percent renders the statute un-
derinclusive. In contrast, the statute is overinclusive because it auto-
matically includes many corporations that have overlapping
shareholders but are separate entities for sound nontax business rea-
sons. Penalizing corporations that operate separately for valid nontax
business reasons does not further the congressional goal. Congress did
not intend to prevent the use of multiple incorporation, only its abuse."I
The Comment begins by examining the current statute and its leg-
islative history in order to determine congressional intent in enacting
the statute, and reviews earlier attempts to accomplish that congres-
sional goal. It then analyzes United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co. ,12 the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the current statute. The next section
discusses some substantive problems with the current definition and
structural problems that accompany purely mechanical statutes of this
kind. The final section proposes a new test, one that recognizes that
control exists where fifty percent of a corporation is owned or con-
trolled by a small group of shareholders. The proposed test exempts
corporations actually operating separately for valid, nontax business
reasons.
Legislative History
Congress has tried three approaches in its attempt to discourage
the abuse of multiple incorporation. Prior to 1964, a multiple corporate
form was disregarded only if the Commissioner could show that a busi-
ness adopted that form with the primary purpose of evading taxes. 13
Congress adopted the first mechanical test attacking multiple incorpo-
11. See infra notes 20-21 & accompanying text.
12. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
13. See Thomas, Brother-Sister Multile Corporations-The Tax Reform Act of 1969
Reformed by Regulation, 28 TAX. L. REv. 65, 66-67 (1972). Prior to 1964, the I.R.S. could
attack brother-sister controlled groups using I.R.C. §§ 269(a)(1) and 482. If a person or
persons acquired 50% control of a corporation with the principal purpose of gaining a tax
benefit, the Commissioner could disallow the benefit, id § 269(b)(1), or apportion it among
the corporations controlled by this same group, id §§ 269(b)(2), 482.
Although the test in § 269 bears some resemblance to the test proposed in this Com-
ment, the two tests are not the same. Section 269 is a much broader test, with no limit on the
number of shareholders whose interests may be considered. Id. § 269(a)(1). Thus, § 269
does not effectively gauge the potential for control by a small group. Section 269 also differs
in that it measures control of each corporation, rather than overlap in control between the
two corporations. Id. § 269(a). Overlap is a significant factor in the ability and motivation
to control the corporations as an entity. See infra notes 46-48 & accompanying text. Like
the proposed test, § 269 is rebuttable. The taxpayer may rebut § 269 by showing that the
principal purpose of using the multiple corporate form was not tax evasion. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.269-5 (1962). Rebuttal of the proposed test, however, depends on the more objective
showing that the corporations are not actually operating as a unit.
ration in the Revenue Act of 1964.14 Under this statute a brother-sister
controlled group existed wherever a "single individual, trust, or estate
own[ed] at least eighty percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote, or at least eighty percent of the total
value of all classes of stock, of each of two or more corporations."'' 5
This narrow definition failed to include many groups of corporations
that could effectively be controlled as a single unit.16
Congress modified the 1964 statute to the current two-pronged test
in 1969. A brother-sister controlled group now exists between
two or more corporations if five or fewer persons who are individu-
als, estates, or trusts own. . . stock possessing-
(A) at least eighty percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote or at least eighty percent of the total
value of shares of all classes of the stock of each corporation, and
(B) more than fifty percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than fifty percent of the
total value of shares of all classes of stock of each corporation, taking
into account the stock ownership of each such person only to the
extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such
corporation. 17
The Treasury regulation adopted contemporaneously differs
slightly in its wording. It states that "[t]he term 'brother-sister con-
trolled group' means two or more corporations if the same five or fewer
persons who are individuals, estates, or trusts own . . . .sing or in
combination,' '1 8 stock sufficient to satisfy both the eighty percent and
fifty percent tests of the statute. Litigation in this area has centered
around whether the words "singly or in combination" are a reasonable
interpretation of the statute or an unwarranted extension of it. 19
14. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 116-25 (1964).
15. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (1964).
16. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 30 (1982). Although a
supermajority vote can be required in the certificate or articles of incorporation, most share-
holder actions require only a simple majority. See infra note 56. The definition also failed
because it included the interest of only one shareholder. A single shareholder could easily
keep his or her interest at 79% or less.
17. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (1982).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3)(i) (1972) (emphasis added).
19. See Libin & Abramowitz, Multivle Corporations:. A Surprising Interpretation of Sec.
1563(a)(2) in Temporary Regulations, 2 TAX ADVISER 326 (1971). These authors present
four possible interpretations of the statute: literal, sweeping, intermediate, and narrow. The
regulation adopts the "sweeping" interpretation, in which some combination of five or fewer
persons must own at least 80% of two or more corporations. The Tax Court adopted the
"narrow" interpretation, in which the 80% ownership group of each corporation must be
composed of the same five or fewer persons. See also infra notes 24, 26; Comment, Brother-
Sister Controlled Corporations: An Analysis of the Conflict Over Interpretation of the "80
Percent" Rule of IlKC. § 1563(a)(2)(A), 21 S. Tax. L.J. 220 (1981). See generally Smith,
Faifax Revisited, 4 J. CORP. TAX'N 347 (1978). See also infra notes 83-86 & accompanying
text.
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The original statute was enacted to discourage a large business
from structuring itself in multiple corporate form in order to increase
its access to tax benefits intended for small businesses. 20 Congress ex-
pressed the same intent in enacting the current version of section
1563.21 The proper interpretation of that test, however, remained in
doubt until early 1982 when the Supreme Court decided United States
v. Vogel Fertilizer Co. 22 In satisfying the eighty percent test, it was un-
clear whether the Commissioner could include only the stockholdings
of the same shareholders counted for the fifty percent test, and whether
each shareholder counted must hold an interest in every corporation in
the group. Alternatively, the group satisfying the eighty percent test
might be a different group than that satisfying the fifty percent test, as
the Treasury regulation would allow.
Case Law
Because the eighty percent test in the 1969 statute was ambiguous,
courts have been divided in their interpretations. 23 Courts supporting
the regulation's interpretation have held that the regulation was enti-
tled to great deference as a contemporaneous construction of the stat-
20. The House of Representatives wished "to limit reduction of surtax exemptions
* . . to cases in which the common owner of the controlled group would otherwise derive
the principal benefit from the alowance of the exemption...." H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th
Cong., Ist Sess. (parenthetical omitted), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1313, 1429; see also S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1149, reprintedin 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1673, 1823.
21. H.R. REP. No. 413,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 99-100, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1645, 1748-49; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 135, rearintedin 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2165-66. The tax benefits that Congress expressly intended
to affect in 1969 were the surtax exemption, accumulated earnings credit, life insurance
small business deduction, and tax benefits allowed to small mutual insurance companies.
See supra note 1 for a list of the tax benefits currently affected.
22. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
23. The arguments on each side of this dispute were first presented in Fairfax Auto
Parts v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798 (1976), rev'dper curiam, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977). Following the Tax Court opinion in Faifax, the cases in this
area were decided based on the rationale of either the majority or dissenting opinions set out
in Fairfax. The holding of the Tax Court in Fairfax was reversed by the Fourth Circuit in a
per curiam opinion, which expressly adopted the reasoning in the Fairfax dissent. 548 F.2d
at 503. Six months after Faioax, the Tax Court reasserted its position in T. L. Hunt, Inc. v.
Commissioner, only to be reversed by the Eighth Circuit. 35 T.C. Mem. 966 (1976), rev'd,
562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977). In 1977 the Tax Court reasserted its Fairfax majority position
in Charles Baloian Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 620 (1977), and a year later in Delta
Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. Mem. 1485 (1978), af'd, 632 F.2d 442 (5th Cir.
1980), cer. denied, 455 U.S. 906 (1982). In 1979 the Tax Court restated its position in Allen
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, but was reversed by the Second Circuit. 38 T.C. Mer. 355 (1979),
rev'd, 614 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1980). Six months later the Tax Court once again asserted its
position in David Chevrolet Co. & Monte Zinn Chevrolet Co. v. Commissioner; the appeal
was dismissed. 39 T.C. Mem. 299 (1979), appeal dismissed, (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1982).
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ute; that it was a reasonable interpretation of the statute; and that it was
not inconsistent with congressional intent.24 These courts asserted that
the fifty percent test measured control, while the eighty percent test en-
sured that all corporations involved were closely held.25
Commentators have argued and other courts have held that the
regulation was an unrealistic interpretation of the statutory language
and was inconsistent with congressional intent.26 These courts agreed
that the fifty percent test measured control, but argued that the eighty
percent test ensured that the shareholders in question had a substantial
financial interest in each corporation.27
The significance of this difference is that, under the interpretation
of those supporting the regulation, the test would be satisfied if eighty
percent of each corporation is owned somewhere in the group of five
stockholders. Opponents of the regulation, however, would require
each stockholder in the group to have an interest in each corporation in
order to be counted towards the eighty percent test.28
Both positions can be illustrated using the following example.2 9
The numbers in the table represent the stockholdings by percentage of
each individual in each corporation.
Corporations
Individuals U V W X Y Identical Ownership
A 55 51 55 55 55 51
B 45 49 - - - 45 (in U and V)
C - - 45 - - -
D - - - 45 - -
E .-. . 45 -
Under the fifty percent test, each stockholder's interest is considered
only to the extent that it is identical with respect to each corporation.
Thus, stockholder A controls fifty-one percent of each of the five corpo-
rations identically. Stockholder B controls forty-five percent of corpo-
rations U and V identically. A's interests alone are sufficient to satisfy
the fifty percent test.
24. Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 1980); T. L. Hunt, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1977); Fairfax Auto Parts v. Commissioner, 548
F.2d 501, 503 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
25. Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d at 340.
26. See Fairfax Auto Parts v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 806; Bonovitz, supra note 1;
Libin & Abramowitz, supra note 19, at 329; Thomas, supra note 13; Weisman, Brother-Sister
Controlled Corporations." On and Off the Road to the Supreme Court With an Edsel, TAXES,
Aug. 1978, at 475; Note, The Brother-Sister Controlled Group Under IZR C. § 1563(a)(2), 67
VA. L. REv. 751 (1981); Note, Brother-Sister Controlled Corporations-Treasury Regulation
Section 1.1563-1(a)(3) Invalidated, 4 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 333 (1981).
27. See infra notes 46, 48.
28. See infra note 43 & accompanying text.
29. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 23 n.7 (1982).
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Satisfaction of the eighty percent test, however, depends upon
which interpretation of the statute is used. Under the taxpayer's inter-
pretation,30 a stockholder must have an interest in every corporation in
the controlled group in order for any of that stockholder's shares to be
counted for the eighty percent test.3 1 Because C, D, and E each have
an interest in only one corporation, their interests would not be
counted. A and B each have an interest in U and V, and together they
own more than eighty percent of each corporation. Therefore, under
the taxpayer's interpretation, only U and V would be members of a
controlled group. In contrast, under the regulation, all five corpora-
tions would be members of a controlled group, because one hundred
percent of each corporation is owned by fewer than five stockholders.
Vogel Fertilizer
In January 1982, the Supreme Court in United States v. VogelFer-
tilizer Co.32 held regulation 1.1563-(a)(3) invalid, thus resolving the
split among the circuits and the Tax Court.33 During the tax years in
question-1973, 1974, and 1975-respondents Vogel Fertilizer Com-
pany and Vogel Popcorn Company had one stockholder in common,
Arthur Vogel. Arthur Vogel owned 77.49% of the outstanding common
stock of Vogel Fertilizer; he also owned 87.5% of the voting power, and
between 90.66% and 93.42% of the value,34 of Vogel Popcorn stock.
Richard Crain owned 22.51% of Vogel Fertilizer, but none of the stock
of Vogel Popcorn 35
Under the Treasury regulation, these corporate taxpayers were
brother-sister affiliated corporations, because Arthur Vogel owned
more than fifty percent of each corporation identically, and Arthur Vo-
gel and Richard Crain together owned more than eighty percent of
30. The term "taxpayer's interpretation" is used to designate the position opposed to
the regulation, since in this area the taxpayers have argued that the regulation was invalid.
See cases cited supra note 23.
31. See infra note 43 & accompanying text.
32. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
33. See supra note 23 & accompanying text.
34. Vogel's stockholdings changed from 1973 to 1975. See infra note 35.
35.
Arthur Vogel
Richard Crain
Vogel Fertilizer Vogel Popcorn Identity
77.49% of stock 90.66% to 77.49%
93.42% of stock**
87.50% of voting power
22.5 1% of stock 0 0
100% or 77.49%* 93.42% 77.49%***
* .depending on whether the regulation is valid
1973-90.66%; 1974-91.42%; 1975-93.42%
* therefore the 50% test is satisfied, and only the 80% test is at issue
January 1983]
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each corporation. 36 Accordingly, the corporations limited themselves
to one surtax exemption, as was appropriate for a controlled group.37
When the Tax Court declared the regulation invalid in Fairfax Auto
Parts v. Commissioner,38 the corporations sued for a refund; as separate
corporations they were entitled to two surtax exemptions. Vogel Ferti-
lizer originated in the Court of Claims 39 and was heard in the Supreme
Court on a writ of certiorari. 4° The Court of Claims held the regula-
tion invalid, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that a stockholder must possess an inter-
est in every corporation in the brother-sister controlled group in order
for that stockholder's interest to be counted for purposes of the eighty
percent test.4' The Court based its conclusion on an examination of the
construction of the statute and congressional intent.42 The statute was
drafted such that "five or fewer persons" was the conjunctive subject of
both the eighty percent test and the fifty percent test. The Court held,
therefore, that both tests must be satisfied by the same ownership
group. Because each stockholder must possess an interest in every cor-
poration for the fifty percent test, each stockholder must possess an in-
terest in every corporation for the eighty percent test as well.43
In holding the regulation invalid, the Vogel Fertilizer Court con-
sidered that Congress intended to combat abuse of the multicorporate
form by businesses that continued to operate as a single enterprise.44
By adopting the 1969 statute, Congress merely broadened the earlier
eighty percent test, so that the stockholdings of five shareholders could
be included in the total.45 The fifty percent test was added only to
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1972).
37. I.R.C. § 1561(a) (1970).
38. 65 T.C. 798 (1976), rev'd, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977).
39. Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 497 (Ct. Cl. 1980), af'd, 455 U.S. 16
(1982). The Court of Claims has been renamed the United States Claims Court.
40. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
41. Id. at 29-30.
42. The Court did state, however, that the regulation was not a wholly unreasonable
interpretation of the literal statutory language. 1d. at 26; see Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. United
States, 634 F.2d at 503.
43. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. at 25 (citing Fairfax Auto Parts v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 803 (1976), rev'dper curiam, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977)); see Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 497, 501-02
(Ct. Cl. 1980); Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 906 (1982).
44. 455 U.S. at 26-27; see Fairfax Auto Parts v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 803.
45. The Court based its analysis of congressional intent on the Treasury explanation
that accompanied the Treasury's proposal of § 1563(a)(2). The Court stated that such reli-
ance was justified because Congress adopted the Treasury draft of § 1563(a)(2), and also the
explanation and interpretation of the statute given by the Treasury during the hearings. 455
U.S. at 31-32; see Hearings an the Subject of Tax Reform gefore House Comm on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5168-70, 5394-96 (1969).
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ensure that the stock was held so that the corporations could be con-
trolled as a unit.46 The Court held that the eighty percent test remained
the determining factor of interrelationship between the corporations:
47
"[I]t is not the smallness of the number of persons in each company that
triggers § 1563; it is the sameness of that small number. . . . It is this
requirement of 'economic entity' which is entirely eviscerated by Reg.
§ 1-1563-1(a)(3)." 48
The two dissenting Justices, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun,
asserted that a Treasury regulation must be upheld unless it is unrea-
sonable; where the statute is ambiguous, a court should defer to the
interpretation of the Commissioner.49 The dissenters argued that the
taxpayers failed to show the regulation to be unreasonable in the face
of an ambiguous legislative history,50 and emphasized language in the
Treasury explanation, stressing that the group of stockholders as a
whole must satisfy the eighty percent test.5 1 These Justices argued that
the regulation was acceptable as a reasonable interpretation of the stat-
46. 455 U.S. at 30; see Fairfax Auto Parts v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 805; Hearings on
the Subject of Tax Reform Before House Comm on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
5168-70, 5394-96 (1969); see Note, Brother-Sister Controlled Groups. The Basic Eighty Per-
cent Stock Ownershp as Control, 58 TEx. L. REv. 1161 (1980).
47. 455 U.S. at 30. On this point the Court of Claims reasoned that since the 1964
statute only considered the stockholdings of one person, that person necessarily held an
interest in each corporation. When Congress expanded the stockholder group to include five
persons, it did not expressly remove the requirement that each stockholder have an interest
in each corporation. Because this would have been a major change in the statute, the Court
of Claims presumed that the overlapping ownership requirement was not changed. 634 F.2d
at 507.
48. 455 U.S. at 30 (citing T. L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532, 537 (8th Cir.
1977) (Webster, J., dissenting)); see Thomas, supra note 13, at 83; see also Bonovitz, supra
note 1, at 517. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit argued that "[c]ommon sense also
suggests that a person should not be considered part of a group that controls a corporation
where the person has no interest in, influence over, or control of the corporation." Delta
Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d at 446.
49. 455 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Fairfax Auto Parts v. Commissioner,
65 T.C. 798, 807 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (citing Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50
(1969), Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Fawcus Mach.
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07
(1967)). "[Interpretive] regulations are given great weight by the courts in resolving doubtful
meanings of the taxing laws, and this is especially true where such regulations have been
formulated contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute .. " 3 C. SANDS, SUTH-
ERLATiD STATUToRY CoNsTmucrioN § 66.04 (4th ed. 1974) (citations omitted).
50. 455 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see 634 F.2d at 514 (Smith, J., dissenting).
51. 455 U.S. at 38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Treasury explanation discussed by
Justice Blackmun is the explanation by the Treasury representative to the House Committee
on Ways and Means, when presenting the current version of the statute to that committee.
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on the Subject of Tax Reform, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. 5168 (1969). Since the statute adopted was identical to that presented by the
Treasury, the Court relied heavily on the explanation in determining congressional intent.
1d. at 29-32.
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ute,52 because" 'it insures that the stock is closely held.' ",53 The dissent
concluded that congressional intent was satisfied as long as both tests
were met by the same group of five or fewer shareholders. 54
Analysis
The Eighty Percent Test
The current test, as enunciated in Vogel Fertilizer, requires that
five or fewer shareholders possess more than fifty percent identical con-
trol of two or more corporations, and also requires these same share-
holders to own at least eighty percent of each corporation. The eighty
percent test may classify two corporations as independent entities for
tax purposes, even though the corporations could easily be controlled
as a unit for most corporate business. For example, in Vogel Fertilizer,
although Arthur Vogel held more than seventy-five percent of the vot-
ing control of each corporation, under the current statute the corpora-
tions were not members of a controlled group.
While the fifty percent test ensures that the same shareholders con-
trol both corporations for most purposes, the purpose of the eighty per-
cent test remains unclear. One possible justification for it is that it
ensures that five or fewer shareholders have the votes necessary to con-
trol actions requiring more than a simple majority. 55 Most shareholder
actions require only a simple majority vote, but many states permit the
voting requirement to be raised to a supermajority. 56 Where the
supermajority requirement in a corporation is eighty percent or less,
control of eighty percent of the voting power of a corporation repre-
52. 455 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice in the Court of
Claims opinion also stated: "[T]he issue in this case is not whether the majority's interpreta-
tion of section 1563(a)(2) is more reasonable than the interpretation espoused by the regula-
tion; the issue is whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute." 634
F.2d at 513 n.1 (Smith, J., dissenting).
53. 455 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614
F.2d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 1980)).
54. Id. at 38-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see 634 F.2d at 514-15 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
55. See Judge Smith's dissent in Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 497,
515 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
56. This can be accomplished in the corporation's articles or bylaws. MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT § 143 (1977). See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(5) (West 1982) (may provide
for a larger quorum or supermajority in the articles of incorporation, except for removal of
directors, election of directors, and dissolution); DEL. CODE AN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (1977)
(may provide for a supermajority in the certificate of incorporation); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 616 (McKinney 1982) (may provide for a larger quorum or supermajority in the certificate
of incorporation). Some supermajority votes are required by statute. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 709(b) (McKinney 1982) (vote of two-thirds of all outstanding voting shares
required to amend the certificate of incorporation to provide for a larger quorum or
supermajority vote, or to eliminate such a provision from the certificate).
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sents control for all purposes, whereas fifty percent voting power would
not.
The fundamental decision is a policy decision about what type of
control the statute should detect. There are two areas of control: con-
trol of everyday activities and control of extraordinary actions. Corpo-
rations in which the question of a controlled group would arise are
closely held corporations. The shareholders are frequently the officers
and directors of such corporations. Substantial stockholdings therefore
reflect substantial control over daily activities of the corporation.
Shareholders holding a simple majority generally have "the power to
determine everyday corporate activities." 57 A higher percentage is nec-
essary only to guarantee a supermajority for extraordinary actions.
The legislative history shows that Congress was primarily con-
cerned about control of everyday activities.58 Since the fifty percent
test measures the power to control everyday activities, it measures what
Congress was concerned about. In contrast, the eighty percent test
measures control over extraordinary events. The effect of the eighty
percent test is to exempt many corporations that would otherwise sat-
isfy the fifty percent control test. The eighty percent test therefore frus-
trates the congressional goal of identifying everyday control of separate
corporations as a single unit.
In addition, in recent years Congress has indicated that it is ame-
nable to reducing the eighty percent test to a fifty percent test for con-
trol for parent-subsidiary controlled groups. In seven statutes that use
the remainder of the control test of section 1563, Congress has ex-
pressly lowered the percentage of control for parent-subsidiary con-
trolled groups from eighty to fifty percent. 59 Significantly, Congress
has labelled a parent-subsidiary group a controlled group at fifty per-
cent, where control exists for many purposes; it may be willing to make
the same policy decision for brother-sister controlled groups.
A second possible justification for the current eighty percent test is
that it ensures that five or fewer shareholders possess such a substantial
financial interest in the corporations that any tax benefits gained by
adopting the multiple corporate form will flow largely to these control-
ling shareholders.60 In deciding whether to adopt a multiple corporate
form for tax reasons, the shareholders must be convinced that the po-
tential tax benefits outweigh the costs of using the multiple corporate
form. As the number of shareholders increases, the transaction costs of
57. Vogel Fertilizer v. United States, 634 F.2d at 515 n.5 (Smith, J., dissenting).
58. See supra notes 44-48 & accompanying text.
59. I.R.C. §§ 179(d)(6),(7) (election to expense depreciable assets), 474(c)(1)(B) (small
businesses sharing an inventory pool), 52(a) (new employee credit), 48(c)(3)(C) (treatment of
used § 38 property), 44F(f(1)(5) (credit for research), 409A(l)(4) (credit for employee stock
ownership plans), 50B(g)(l) (work incentive program credit) (1982).
60. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. at 29.
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changing to the multicorporate form increase, and the benefits are
more widely dispersed. At some point these costs, plus the costs that
are duplicated by operating several corporations instead of a single cor-
poration, will exceed the benefits. The eighty percent test can be satis-
fied only by a highly concentrated corporation, where the tax benefits
of multiple incorporation will likely exceed the costs, but it is an arbi-
trary percentage. Corporations that would satisfy a lower percentage
test than eighty percent could be motivated purely by tax benefits to
incorporate multiply, because the shareholders have determined that
there is a net benefit. There is no way to prove that eighty percent is
the percentage at which the benefits first begin to outweight the costs.
This financial interest argument therefore provides only a weak justifi-
cation for the eighty percent test.
The eighty percent test should be eliminated from the current stat-
ute because it makes the statute underinclusive and because there is no
strong, independent justification for it. It makes the statute underinclu-
sive in that the current two-prong test will fail to detect many corpora-
tions where everyday control of two or more corporations is centered in
the same five or fewer shareholders, because those shareholders own
less than eighty percent of the stock of each corporation. The eighty
percent test can neither be justified as an additional control test, nor as
a financial interest test.
The Mechanical Test
Whereas the eighty percent test makes the statute underinclusive,
the mechanical format of the statute makes it overinclusive. While a
purely mechanical test is easily administered, the absence of exceptions
makes the current statute a rather blunt instrument. It measures over-
lapping stockholdings, but does not distinguish between corporations
operating as a single enterprise and those operating as independent cor-
porations. Congress did not intend to eliminate multiple incorporation;
it sought only to prevent the abuse of the multiple corporate form by
those adopting it purely for tax benefit. 6'
Corporations with overlapping shareholders can be operated sepa-
rately for sound nontax business reasons.62 For example, suppose that
shareholder A holds a fifty-five percent interest in corporation X and a
twenty-five percent interest in corporation Y. Shareholder B holds a
twenty-five percent interest in corporation X and a fifty-five percent
61. See supra notes 20-22 & accompanying text; United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,
455 U.S. at 26-27.
62. For a discussion of nontax business reasons for multiple incorporation, see T. NEss
& E. VOGEL, TAxATION OF THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION § 2.4 (3d ed. 1976 & Supp.
1982); Tobolowsky, Advantages in Use of Multiple Corporations in Spite of Reform Act: At-
tendant Hazards, 35 J. TAx'N 330, 331 (1971); see also Warhaftig, Multiple Corporations:
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interest in corporation Y. Corporation X runs a hotel, and corporation
Y makes computer chips. The stockholdings of A and B in corpora-
tions X and Y make the corporations a brother-sister controlled group
under section 1563(a)(2). Yet corporations X and Y are operated sepa-
rately because their areas of business are unrelated, not because of tax
considerations; for this reason, they should arguably be exempt from
treatment as a controlled group. The current conclusive test precludes
such an exception. A better statute would include narrowly defined
criteria designed to characterize an exemption for this situation.
Structural Criticism
Assuming that a fifty percent test is preferable to an eighty percent
test because it measures daily control, and that the statute should con-
tain some exceptions, the next issue is the form in which the test should
appear. One possibility is to place the fifty percent test and the excep-
tions within the statute itself. Alternatively, the fifty percent test could
be in the statute, and the exceptions could appear in legislative regula-
tions. A third possibility is to write the fifty percent test into the statute,
and provide for regulations listing factors to consider in granting an
exception, leaving discretion to the courts to examine the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case.
The responsibility for resolving ambiguities in a tax statute may
rest with Congress, the Treasury, or the courts. Congress could draft a
detailed statute lending certainty to the many situations specifically
covered, or it could draft a generalized statute expressly providing for
legislative regulations. The Treasury could then promulgate regula-
tions having the force of law, unless they exceed the power delegated.
If a given fact situation is not expressly covered by either the statute or
a legislative regulation, the taxpayer may litigate the issue. Thus, in
choosing the structure of a tax statute, Congress chooses the forum in
which the ambiguities of the statute will be resolved.
Both theoretical and practical arguments favor Congress drafting a
detailed statute. The tax system, in addition to raising revenue, is a
powerful political tool-encouraging some types of behavior, discour-
Advantages, Disadvantages and Risks, 29 N.Y.U. INST. oN FED. TAX'N 533, 536-37 (1971).
Some nontax business reasons for multiple incorporation of an existing business are:
(1) separating assets between corporations to provide additional protection through
limited liability;
(2) ease of obtaining credit by segregating many stable assets to one corporation;
(3) each corporation may have separate employee benefit plans and labor agreements;
(4) ease in selling one part of the business; and
(5) separation of regulated activities to one corporation.
The I.R.S. has considered these business purposes irrelevant, since a tax benefit is also
gained.
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aging others, and, to some extent, shifting income. 63 The responsibility
for making such policy decisions lies with Congress.64 Because the
mechanical details of a provision determine its ultimate effectiveness,
drafting the details arguably should be an integral part of establishing
policy. On a practical level, a detailed statute provides certainty in the
many fact situations expressly covered.65 A detailed statute allows less
room for maneuvering, however, when the taxpayer seeks a good faith
argument for more favorable tax treatment.
In reality, however, statutes are drafted hurriedly, with clauses
layered one on the other to satisfy special interest groups prodding the
individual members of Congress participating in the drafting process. 66
If a statute is intended to be comprehensive, but a gap later appears,
the same drafting procedures must be worked through in order to re-
solve the ambiguity.67 The resulting statute is often complex and the
original policy may be obscured. 68
As long as Congress dictates the fiscal policy, there is no constitu-
tional barrier to delegating the specifics to the Treasury.69 Arguably,
such delegation results in much more coherent law, because it is devel-
oped systematically over a longer period of time than the congressional
drafting process.70 Broad participation in the process is encouraged;
63. See, e.g., Danziger & Haveman, Tax and Welfare Simplocation." An Analysis of
Distributional and Regional Impacts, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 269 (1977). The progressive structure
of the tax is a prime example.
64. The power of Congress to regulate through the exercise of its power to tax has been
well established. See, e.g., Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 541 (1869); United
States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919). Congress cannot delegate this power to any other
body. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407-09 (1927). No other branch of
government has concurrent power to dictate taxing policies. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
1. Therefore the only constitutional source of tax policy is Congress.
65. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code. The Problem of the Management
of Tax Detail, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 673, 697 (1969).
66. Surrey, supra note 65, at 697-98; see also McDaniel, Federal Income Tax Simpl#Fca-
tion: The Political Process, 34 TAX L. REv. 27, 31-76 (1978). McDaniel argues that lobbyists
are much less a factor in a structural statute than a tax expenditure statute. Id. at 72. Sec-
tion 1563 would be characterized as a structural statute. See also Waris, Practical andPhilo-
sophical Observations on the Tax Legislative Process, 38 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N
30.01-.07 (1980).
67. Surrey, supra note 65, at 698. A comprehensive statute leaves room only for regula-
tions adding a clarifying gloss to eliminate an ambiguity.
68. Id. at 699. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168 (1981) (accelerated cost recovery system).
69. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407-09 (1927).
70. See Surrey, supra note 65, at 697-98, 703. Delegation allows Congress to stand
back after passing a tax statute and see whether the Treasury promulgates regulations that
validly carry out congressional intent. The Treasury can develop the details without polit-
ical pressure, leaving Congress to review the final product. The process can take months or
even years. It effectively gives Congress the benefit of hindsight and relieves Congress of the
burden of developing the detail. See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 66, at 63 n.69 (noting codi-
fication by Congress of stock dividend regulation in I.R.C. § 305(b) (1969)).
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the Treasury publishes proposed regulations and invites commentary
on them for a prescribed period of time.71 Because the Treasury staff
drafts only tax regulations, it can arguably develop more expertise in
that area than a legislator. Further, when a problem with a regulation
arises, the Treasury can more readily amend it than Congress can
amend a statute.72
Legislative regulations, however, are also subject to criticism.
First, because the Treasury is not accountable to the voters, one might
question whether such extensive discretion should be granted to an ad-
ministrative agency. Opposition to taxation without representation is
deeply rooted in American history.73 This criticism is muted in a stat-
ute such as section 1563, which is directed at a gap in the taxing struc-
ture, rather than at political policymaking.
A second criticism of legislative regulations is that, where they
concern a complex matter, the Treasury requires a long time to develop
appropriate regulations. Meanwhile, taxpayers are left with little gui-
dance for their actions. The most egregious illustration of this is the
regulations under I.R.C. section 385, which still have not been adopted
more than thirteen years after the statute was passed.
A third criticism might be aimed at the Treasury's objectivity in
making regulations. While the Treasury is not subject to pressure from
lobbyists, it is charged with collecting revenue, and would arguably in-
terpret a statute to maximize revenue.74 Because a legislative regula-
tion can be rejected by a court only if the Treasury exceeds the
authority delegated in the statute, the Treasury would win most cases
challenging the regulations.75 Therefore, although legislative regula-
tions increase certainty, they do so only by allowing the Treasury to
win more cases. If a taxpayer disagrees with a Treasury interpretation
that is within the authority delegated by Congress, the taxpayer can
change the situation only with a statutory amendment. Thus, private
tax bills are encouraged, with Congress filling in the details it originally
deferred by allowing for legislative regulations. This postponement
can be beneficial, however, because Congress can then make its deci-
sion with the benefit of hindsight and the contribution of the Treasury
staff through its regulations.
71. The proposed regulations are published in the Federal Register. A period of time
for commentary is specified (usually 30 days), and the name and address of the proper party
to receive the commentary is listed. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 30,796 (1982).
72. The Treasury can issue proposed regulations and make them final 30 days later.
The congressional process of working an amendment through the necessary committees and
votes takes much longer.
73. See, eg., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
161-75 (1967).
74. Surrey, supra note 65, at 698.
75. See infra note 83.
A second alternative is to allow the courts broad discretion. The
advantage of broad judicial discretion is that a court can examine the
facts and circumstances of each case, to determine whether Congress
intended to include a given taxpayer within the group to be taxed or
benefitted by a given Code provision. Such a system, however, has no
predictability, because the case holdings are frequently irreconcilable
76
and similarly situated taxpayers can receive vastly different treatment.
This is a critical flaw in a tax statute affecting a business, because many
business transactions are structured to minimize taxes, and uncertainty
can be expensive.
Statutory Construction
Given the imperfection of language, all statutes will contain some
ambiguities.77 By controlling the nature of the regulations accompany-
ing the statute, the structure of the statute determines where those am-
biguities will be clarified. At the top of the hierarchy for interpreting a
tax statute is the plain language of the statute. At the second level are
the legislative regulations expressly authorized in the statute.7  The
third level includes those regulations attempting to define a term in the
statute that is so general that it merits an interpretive regulation.79 Fi-
nally, at the fourth level, are regulations like that at issue in Vogel Ferti-
lizer: those merely adding a clarifying gloss to a term already defined
in the statute. 80 Each succeeding level is entitled to less deference than
the preceding one.81 Should an ambiguity arise, the role of resolving
the ambiguity increasingly devolves on the court.
76. A good example of this approach can be seen in the case law leading up to I.R.C.
§ 385 (1969) and in the 13 years since its adoption. Although § 385 expressly allows for
legislative regulations, the delay in issuing those regulations has left the statute in a form
that requires the courts to analyze the facts and circumstances in each case in order to char-
acterize an interest as stock or debt. See, e.g., Post Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1296,
1303 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (citing John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946)).
Such a procedure lends virtually no predictability.
77. An ongoing debate has considered the best structure for a tax statute. The debate is
being waged under the heading of "tax simplification." For a list of articles in this area, see
McDaniel, supra note 66, at 27 n. 1. Some commentators have proposed leaving most details
to the Treasury to fill in by regulation. Surrey, supra note 65, at 703-07; McDaniel, supra
note 66, at 63; Roberts, Friedman, Ginsburg, Loutman, Lubick, Young & Zeitman, 4 Report
on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAx. L. REV. 325, 348-49 (1972). Another commen-
tator has proposed the formation of a commission to develop a comprehensive tax plan that
would eliminate the haphazard development of current tax law. Nolan, Federal Income Tax
Simplofcation and the Political Process, 10 TAX ADVISER 717 (1979). This proposal has been
criticized as merely shifting an essentially political problem to a new arena of dubious com-
petence. See McDaniel, supra note 66, at 73.
78. See infra note 83.
79. See infra note 84.
80. See infra note 85.
81. See infra notes 83-86 & accompanying text.
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The standard of review at each level described above is succes-
sively broader, allowing a court more discretion in overturning it.82 If
the language of a statute is plain, the court must follow it, except upon
a finding of unconstitutionality. It must uphold a legislative regulation,
unless the regulation clearly exceeds the delegated authority. 83 An in-
terpretive regulation, promulgated under the Commissioner's general
authority, must be upheld unless it is unreasonable and clearly incon-
sistent with the statute.84 A regulation that merely adds a clarifying
gloss to a term defined in the statute will be upheld only if it is reason-
able and consistent with the statute; it receives less deference than an
interpretive regulation, however, because it can be measured against a
specific provision in the Code.8 5 As illustrated in Vogel Fertilizer, the
last principle gives the court the opportunity to analyze the statute's
legislative history and policy, and to substitute its own conclusion if it
disagrees with that of the Commissioner.8 6
The often competing values of certainty, fairness, and adminis-
trability are factors in determining where the details of a tax statute
should be filled in. Section 1563(a)(2) defines a taxable business entity.
In choosing the form in which to do business, the individuals involved
must know the consequences of doing business in that form and the
mechanical requirements for receiving treatment in a given form. This
certainty is possible through either a detailed statute or legislative
regulations.
The proposed changes in the test itself indicate that the use of lim-
ited legislative regulations would be most appropriate for this statute.
Since the statute defines a taxable business entity, the parameters of the
definition should be clear in the statute itself to avoid any uncertainty.
The exceptions should be listed in the statute, with further elaboration
expressly left for regulations. This would provide a framework, within
which the Treasury could quickly promulgate appropriate legislative
82. Id.
83. Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247,253 (1981); Goldman v. Commissioner,
497 F.2d 382, 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974); 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3.20 (rev. ed. 1981).
84. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741,750 (1969). An interpretive regulation is promul-
gated under the Commissioner's general authority to 'prescribe all needful rules and regula-
tions." I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1982). An interpretive regulation is proper where Congress drafts a
statute using a general term that needs a working definition. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n
v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979) (citing Helvering v. Reynolds Co., 306 U.S. 110,
114 (1939)). To determine whether an interpretive regulation is reasonable, the court exam-
ines "whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statue, its origin and
its purpose." Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. at 253 (citing National Muffler Dealers
Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)).
85. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 445 U.S. at 24; Rowan Cos. v. United States,
452 U.S. at 253.
86. 455 U.S. at 25-32.
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regulations. The taxpayer, however, would have a sense of the limits of
the statute without the regulations.
Proposal
This Comment proposes a new statute that would remedy the
problems described above, while carrying out the intent of Congress to
curb abuse of the multiple corporate form. The following is a proposed
draft:
(A) Except as provided in subsection (B), two or more corporations
will be considered members of a brother-sister controlled group
if five or fewer persons who are individuals, estates, or trusts
own (within the meaning of subsection (d)(2)) stock possessing
more than fifty percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than fifty percent of
the total value of all classes of stock of each corporation, taking
into account the stock ownership of each such person only to
the extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to each
such corporation.
(B) Even though two or more corporations satisfy the fifty percent
test of subsection (A), the corporations shall be deemed not to
be members of a brother-sister controlled group if they can
show either all of the following:
(1) the corporations neither produce similar goods, nor per-
form similar services, and
(2) one corporation neither produces goods for the use of, nor
performs services for the benefit of, one of the other corpo-
rations, and
(3) no money or property has been loaned, directly or indi-
rectly, by one corporation to another corporation in the
group,
or they can show that under the law of the state(s) in which the
corporations are incorporated, or under the terms of the articles
of incorporation or the shareholder agreements, the interests
held by the five or fewer shareholders counted for the fifty per-
cent test are insufficient to take any shareholder actions without
including the votes of shareholders not counted for the fifty per-
cent test.
(C) The Secretary shall promulgate regulations defining the terms
"similar goods" and "similar services," and any other regula-
tions as may be necessary and appropriate to effectuate this
subsection.
Regulations that may be appropriate are the following:
(a) Similar goods are products which could serve as substitutes, or
which could be produced by the same corporation without sig-
nificant retooling.
(b) Similar services are services which could be performed by the
employees of one corporation without significant additional
training or equipment.
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This statute retains the merits of the current test, while correcting
its major flaws. It retains the mechanical character of the current test,
since a mechanical test is useful as a screening device and evidentiary
tool. By changing the test to a simple fifty percent identical control test,
the proposed statute will screen all situations in which the potential for
unified control exists, thus closing the gap between fifty and eighty per-
cent ownership. Unlike the current test, the proposed statute exempts
corporations that are actually operating as separate corporations.
The functional distinctions in subsection (B) are designed to in-
clude any interactions between the two corporations. If the corpora-
tions provide no business benefits to each other, no purpose is served
by treating them as a controlled group. Provision one of subsection (B)
includes splinter corporations that have divided merely to gain tax ben-
efits, while continuing in the same line of business. Provision two in-
cludes vertical arrangements. Provision three prevents the transfer of
assets freely between the two corporations. If none of the three ar-
rangements exists, it is difficult to argue that the corporations are oper-
ating as an entity.
The proposed statute expressly provides for legislative regulations
defining similar goods and similar services. The definitions of these
terms can best be developed through examples and are appropriate top-
ics for regulations. The delegation of authority to the Treasury is suffi-
ciently narrow that the Treasury should be able to promptly develop
appropriate regulations. The proposed statute preserves the certainty
of the current test, while eliminating the anomalies plaguing the cur-
rent definition.
Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court holding in Vogel Fertilizer clarifies
the interpretation of the current statute, the statute itself is flawed. En-
actment of a statute that simplifies the test to a mechanical fifty percent
identical ownership test, while exempting corporations not actually op-
erating as a single entity, would resolve the problems created by the
existing statute. The time has come for a statute that will curb the
abuse of multiple incorporation without penalizing corporations not
actually operating as an entity.
Barbara Hunt Moldave*
* Member, Third Year Class.
January 1983] BROTHER-SISTER CONTROLLED GROUPS

